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Historical background
In the Soviet era, the state was1the exclusive owner 
of land. Agricultural businesses (kolkhozes and 
sovkhozes) enjoyed the right to use land free 
of charge and for an indefinite period, whereas 
the buildings situated on this land, the machines 
and other movable items were their own prop-
1 Smaller companies – up to 100 ha, medium-sized compa-
nies – 100–1000 ha.
erty. Small allotment gardens – tiny farms that 
the kolkhoz employees were allowed to use for 
personal purposes – were a portion of land used 
by the specific kolkhoz. Soviet-era Ukraine was 
dominated by farms performing extensive land 
management, i.e. kolkhozes (production cooper-
atives) and sovkhozes (state-owned companies). 
In 1990, there were around 8,000 kolkhozes in 
Ukraine and around 3.8 million kolkhoz workers. 
Small allotment gardens cultivated using intensive 
farming methods and sometimes using horticul-
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On 28 April, President Volodymyr Zelensky signed the Act on introducing an agricultural land mar-
ket in Ukraine. The document envisages that the moratorium on the sale of agricultural land will be 
partially lifted on 1 July 2021 and entirely lifted from 2024. As a consequence, for the first time in 
the history of independent Ukraine, the free trade of agricultural land will be allowed. However, for-
eigners and even Ukrainian companies foreign shareholders will not have the right to buy land until 
a nation-wide referendum concerning this issue has been held. Regardless of certain reservations as 
to the wording of the act, the fact that it has been passed is a breakthrough moment for Ukraine. 
These reservations for example relate to the risk that antitrust provisions may be bypassed and also to 
the need to enact a number of laws and to implement acts regulating the practical operation of the 
land market. It should not be expected that major changes in the ownership structure of agricultural 
land will happen on a large scale by 2024. However, the act will have far-reaching consequences for 
Ukrainian agriculture in the mid- and long-term perspective. It will enable increased production and 
facilitate development in those sectors which are currently underinvested. It is also expected to im-
prove the position of small and medium-sized agricultural companies at the cost of big agricultural 
holdings and to boost the status of Ukraine as one of global leaders in the production of foodstuffs.
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tural methods accounted for 29.6% of agricultural 
production including 48.1% of animal production.2
In 1992, a  law was enacted to reform the kol- 
khozes. It did not abolish them but granted the 
kolkhozniks the right to obtain a portion of their 
kolkhoz’s land which had been allotted to them 
(a so-called pai). The law did not envisage de-
limiting these plots of land in the field and on 
the maps (they were to be delimited only when 
the owner of a specific pai intended to leave the 
kolkhoz and farm their land on their own). Due to 
the fact that this process solely covered land, the 
kolkhozniks were expropriated of their shares in 
most of the kolkhoz property, i.e. buildings, ma-
chines and assets belonging to the cooperatives. 
This considerably facilitated the privatisation of 
kolkhozes.
The process of determining the size of specif-
ic pais (1–8 hectares depending on the region) 
lasted ten years. It involved determining the area 
of land allotted to each kolkhoznik and issuing 
a relevant certificate (the pai certificate) showing 
its holder’s share in the land used by the kol-
khoz. The process of dividing the land into pais 
covered the entire land owned by cooperatives, 
and certificates confirming their holder’s right to 
obtain a pai were issued to 6–8 million individuals, 
according to various figures. The vast majority 
of these certificates were leased to executives of 
agricultural companies or brought as a contribu-
tion in kind to the companies they managed; only 
approximately 6% were transformed into the right 
to use a specific physically delimited plot of land.
The introduction of the moratorium 
and its consequences
In 2001, a land code was adopted in Ukraine which 
introduced property rights to agricultural land. 
At that time it was decided (not without reason) 
that the country was not ready to introduce free 
trade in agricultural land, for example due to there 
2 T. Olszański, A quarter-century of independent Ukraine. 
Dimensions of transformation, OSW, Warsaw, 2017, p. 46, 
www.osw.waw.pl.
being no land cadastre register. As a consequence, 
the introduction of free trade in agricultural land 
was suspended (according to Ukrainian legal no-
menclature it was covered by a moratorium) until 
the necessary conditions are met.
The suspension of the right to buy and sell agri-
cultural land was prolonged annually until 2019 
for political and social reasons (see below). In the 
meantime, two highly important processes hap-
pened. The first one involved the concentration of 
agricultural land and resulted in the creation of the 
so-called agro-holdings or companies performing 
their farming activity on tens or even hundreds 
of thousands of hectares leased from pai owners. 
Ukraine’s ten biggest agro-holdings lease a total 
of 2.8 million hectares of land.3 The owners of 
these companies have gradually become one of 
the country’s major groups capable of exerting 
political pressure, alongside oligarchs operating 
in heavy industry.
The other process involved the former kolkhozniks 
dying out, many of them heirless, which resulted 
in the emergence of pais that have not been inher-
ited and were frequently used by the owners of 
agricultural companies non-contractually (the area 
of these pais is estimated at 1.6 million hectares 
and this figure is rapidly growing). The practice 
of using these plots of land free of charge was an 
important motivation to prevent the introduction 
of the reform to deal with the ownership situation 
in agriculture.
The absence of land ownership rights has con-
tributed to the emergence of a unique model of 
agriculture in Ukraine, which is oriented towards 
obtaining the maximum profit in the short term 
3 Э. Редих, ‘Аграрные итоги маркетингового года 
2018/2019’, Бизнес Цензор, 7 October 2019, www.censor.
net.ua.
The process of determining the size 
of specific pais lasted ten years and 
certificates confirming the owner-
ship right to pais were issued to 
6–8 million individuals.
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with minimum outlays. Agricultural production is 
dominated by cereal and oil crops, whereas the 
sectors that require more significant outlays (such 
as the cultivation of perennial plants and animal 
husbandry) and the food processing sector remain 
much less developed, even though they gener-
ate a much higher profit in the long term. This 
results from a reluctance to carry out long-term 
investments on leased land. In addition, due to 
the absence of land ownership, companies using 
this land rarely care about using it properly, which 
results in soil productivity becoming degraded.
Despite the unique model of land use, recent years 
have seen a dynamic development of agriculture 
in Ukraine. For example, between 2015 and 2019 
sunflower crops increased from 11.2 to 15.3 mil-
lion tons, wheat crops from 26.5 to 28.3 million 
tons and maize crops from 23.3 to 35.9 million 
tons. Agriculture has become the driving force 
of foreign trade, overtaking metallurgy. In 2019, 
Ukraine’s export of foodstuffs and agricultural 
produce stood at US$ 22.1 billion and accounted 
for 44.2% of its total exports, whereas the export 
of metallurgical products stood at US$ 10.2 bil-
lion (20.5% of total exports). As a consequence, 
Ukraine has become one of the major players on 
the global agricultural produce market. According 
to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations (FAO), Ukraine is the world’s top 
exporter of sunflower oil and a major exporter 
of wheat (5th place), maize (4th place), rapeseed 
(3rd place) and barley (3rd place).4
Political games with the moratorium
Almost as soon as the moratorium was introduced 
in Ukraine, debates were launched about lifting 
it and on introducing free trade in agricultural 
land. This solution was mainly supported by liberal 
free market-oriented groups but their voice was 
always marginal. In addition, Ukraine’s coopera-
tion programme with the International Monetary 
Fund signed in 2014 contained a requirement 
that the moratorium should be lifted. However, 
until recently it was never viewed as a necessary 
4 Data for 2017, www.fao.org.
condition for Ukraine to receive new loan instal-
ments.5 The IMF never recommended any specific 
shape the agricultural reform should take, nor did 
it demand that foreigners should be allowed to 
buy land in Ukraine.
The main opponents of the plan to lift the mor-
atorium included nationalist groups which view 
land as a basis for the nation’s existence, alongside 
populist groups which capitalise on pointing to 
the threat that national property may be sold off. 
The latter groups include the Batkivshchyna party 
led by Yulia Tymoshenko and the Radical Party 
of Oleh Lyashko. The attitude of the populists 
resulted from the fact that the plan to lift the 
moratorium is supported by a minor portion of 
society. Back in February 2020, a Razumkov Centre 
poll showed that a mere 19.6% of Ukrainians sup-
ported the introduction of free trade in agricultural 
land and as many as 64.4% were opposed to it. 
Such a high proportion of respondents who are 
opposed to this change results from their fear of 
a repeat of  the situation in the 1990s involving 
the privatisation of state property. Back then, most 
profitable companies and industrial plants were 
taken over by a group of oligarchs for a minor 
portion of their market value. There were also fears 
that inhabitants of rural areas may be exposed 
to the social consequences of large agricultural 
companies acquiring property rights because the 
income these individuals earn from leasing their 
pais is an important element of their livelihood. 
Due to this public mood, none of the political 
forces which were in power post-2001 viewed 
the introduction of free trade in agricultural land 
as a priority.
In addition, this status quo was favourable for 
powerful agro-holdings which had access to fund-
5 It was not until April 2020 that representatives of the 
IMF directly mentioned the adoption of the act on the 
land market as a necessary condition for signing the new 
cooperation programme.
The absence of land ownership 
has resulted in the emergence of 
a unique model of Ukrainian agri-
culture.
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ing from other sources. Prior to the 2009 crisis, 
one method to obtain funds involved getting 
the company listed on foreign stock exchanges 
(five Ukrainian agricultural companies are listed 
on the Warsaw Stock Exchange). Other methods 
included: issuing bonds, taking out individual 
loans for big companies, and (in the case of the 
biggest agro-holdings) using funding opportuni-
ties offered by their own bank. These measures 
enabled these companies to gain a competitive 
advantage over smaller companies which were 
not in a position to use this type of instrument.
The lifting of the moratorium
The prospect of the moratorium being lifted 
emerged after the presidential victory of Volo-
dymyr Zelensky. During his campaign, he had 
supported this solution and even included it in 
his programme as one of its most important el-
ements. According to his team, the introduction 
of free trade in agricultural land was intended as 
an important stimulus boosting the development 
of the Ukrainian economy as a whole. Following 
parliamentary elections and the forming of a new 
majority in the Verkhovna Rada (Ukrainian par-
liament), a bill was submitted to introduce free 
trade in agricultural land. The first reading took 
place in November 2019. The bill sparked major 
controversy mainly due to the proposed very high 
threshold preventing land concentration (200,000 
hectares) and the provision enabling companies 
with foreign capital to buy land. A portion of 
the opposition (the Batkivshchyna party and the 
pro-Russian Opposition Platform – For Life) at-
tempted to block the adoption of the act by sub-
mitting more than 4,000 amendments which took 
four months to consider. Finally, Zelensky agreed 
to a compromise regarding the most sensitive 
issues. As a consequence, in the bill submitted for 
the second reading the concentration threshold 
was reduced, a ban on the sale of state-owned 
land was added and a provision was included, 
according to which a referendum will need to 
be held on the sale of land to foreign businesses 
and to Ukrainian companies owned or co-owned 
by foreign citizens. This sale will be allowed if the 
referendum result is positive.
Despite certain objections, including in the ruling 
party, on 31 March 2020 the Verkhovna Rada 
ultimately adopted this act. The act would have 
been impossible to pass if not for the support 
from two opposition parties – European Solidar-
ity and Voice (as regards the governing Servant 
of the People party, only 206 out of its 248 MPs 
voted in favour of the act). The Batkivshchyna 
party, the Opposition Platform – For Life, and 
most non-aligned MPs voted against the act. On 
4 May 2020, a portion of these MPs (48 individuals 
including Yulia Tymoshenko) filed a motion with 
the Constitutional Court to declare the act illegal 
due to procedural reasons. Consideration of this 
motion will likely last for several years. However, 
it is unlikely that the act could be annulled. In 
its adjudicating practice to date, the court most 
frequently took a loyal position towards the gov-
ernment in Kyiv. Despite low public support for 
the lifting of the moratorium, the voting has not 
sparked social protests.6 Nor has the act triggered 
criticism from the media (including those media 
outlets which are owned by oligarchs). This may 
suggest that the adopted model of trade in land 
does balance out the interests of land owners, 
agricultural companies and the state.
Although the act’s adoption was among the nec-
essary conditions the IMF had indicated in the 
context of it resuming its cooperation with Ukraine, 
it seems that the attitude of President Zelensky 
was the decisive factor in this case. Without the 
president’s personal involvement (the vote was 
held in his presence and he had called on the MPs 
to vote in favour of the act), the result of the vote 
would have been uncertain.
6 Several demonstrations were held between the first and the 
second reading of the bill. However, they were not large-
scale spontaneous demonstrations; they were most likely 
staged by Ihor Kolomoysky in an attempt to put pressure 
on the government.
The prospect of the moratorium be-
ing lifted emerged following Zelen-
sky’s presidential victory. During his 
campaign, he had supported this 
solution.
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The provisions of the act…
The act concerns the 41.5 million hectares of land 
covered by the moratorium and envisages the 
liberalised  trade in this land from 1 July 2021. 
A transitional period will apply for 2.5 years. Dur-
ing this period only natural persons will be allowed 
to buy land, at a maximum of 100 hectares per 
person. Starting from 1 January 2024, corporate 
entities will also be allowed to buy land and the 
limit will be increased to up to 10,000 hectares 
of land per buyer. Banks will have the right to 
acquire land ownership rights only if they receive 
it as a pledge for an unpaid loan and they will 
be obliged to sell it within two years. Until 2030, 
the selling price cannot be lower than the reg-
ulated price determined by the State Service of 
Ukraine for Geodesy, Cartography and Cadastre 
(see Appendix).
The pre-emption right will be vested in those 
leaseholders who leased the land in 2010 or earlier. 
They will be offered the opportunity to purchase 
the land and gradually pay it off over ten years 
at a price determined in a regulated valuation. 
This provision will also cover state-owned land 
(a total of 10.4 million hectares) whose sale is 
otherwise banned.
The right for foreigners to buy land roused major 
controversy. The wording of the bill submitted 
for the first reading included a provision which 
enabled this. However, due to negative political 
and social reactions,  a requirement was added 
to this provision of the adopted version of the 
act, that a referendum must be held on this is-
sue. The public mood in Ukraine suggests that 
a negative result of the referendum is certain, no 
matter when it is held. However, should Ukrainians 
decide otherwise and agree to the sale of land 
to foreign citizens, the buyers could not include 
corporate entities owned or co-owned by a for-
eign country,7 Russian citizens and the following 
categories of companies: companies registered in 
tax havens, companies based in FATF-listed third 
countries which fail to take effective measures 
against money laundering, and companies whose 
owners cannot be identified. Regardless of the 
referendum result, a ban on foreigners buying 
land within a 50 kilometre border zone will ap-
ply. In addition, a ban on altering the ownership 
structure of land located in the Autonomous 
Republic of Crimea and in the so-called Donetsk 
and Luhansk People’s Republics was introduced.
...and numerous doubts
There are several aspects in which the adopted 
document is vague and in which it refers to de-
tailed provisions to be enacted in separate legal 
acts in the future. One such aspect involves the 
10,000 hectare land ownership limit. Although the 
details of this limit were agreed during the second 
reading, it seems that it will be possible to bypass 
the limit by registering land as to the property of 
family members, which would make it possible 
to concentrate up to around fifty thousands of 
hectares in the hands of a single owner. For the 
vast majority of agricultural companies this will 
be a sufficient area to maintain the current level 
of their operations – at present a mere ten to 
twenty agricultural holdings lease areas in excess 
of 50,000 hectares.
It is unclear how the ban on land concentration 
will be enforced in practice. According to the act, 
detailed rules of supervision in this field will be de-
fined in a separate government order. In line with 
the act, the notary public who draws up a specific 
contract will be required to check in the relevant 
register whether the given individual or entity 
is allowed to buy land. In Ukrainian conditions, 
this poses a major risk of corruption. It cannot 
be ruled out that giant agricultural holdings will 
make attempts to illegally purchase land through 
a network of their subsidiaries or bribed natural 
7 This is mainly intended as protection against investment 
funds owned by China and the Arab countries.
A major controversy concerned for-
eigners acquiring the right to buy 
land. A requirement was added to 
the adopted version of the act that 
a referendum must be held on this 
issue.
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persons (so-called frontmen). However, this prac-
tice will offer no guarantee of land ownership in 
the long term – if it is revealed that an area of more 
than 10,000 hectares was purchased or that the 
purchased land is de facto owned by a non-eligible 
individual (e.g. it is inherited), the owner will be 
required to sell the land within a year. Otherwise, 
the land will be confiscated from them pursuant 
to a court decision and sold by tender. The money 
earned from this sale minus the court costs will 
be transferred to the land’s former owner. The 
ban on non-Ukrainian companies buying land 
will affect local companies listed on foreign stock 
exchanges and companies owned and co-owned 
by foreign entities. It remains to be seen whether 
these companies will find a way to circumvent 
this provision.
At present, it is difficult to assess the practical 
aspect of the process of changing the land own-
ership structure. There is a risk that there may 
be numerous cases of the illegal excessive con-
centration of land. The situation will depend on 
whether the register of corporate entities, the 
land cadastre register and the property register 
are effectively combined. Although the act does 
contain a provision on increasing the exchange 
of information between these registers and the 
technical aspect of their full synchronisation seems 
relatively easy, it remains to be seen whether the 
Ukrainian leadership will be willing to guarantee 
full transparency of land ownership.8
Another question with no easy answer regards 
whether companies have sufficient funds to buy 
vast areas of land. Should a mere 10% of Ukraine’s 
total amount of agricultural land be sold at a reg-
ulated price (in Ukraine this is US$ 1,000 per one 
hectare of land on average), this would be tanta-
8 One example showing that transparency is possible is the 
requirement to present the de facto owners of radio and 
TV stations. If this is not met the media outlets in question 
may be stripped of their licence.
mount to an expense of more than US$ 4 billion, 
which is an extremely high amount by local stand-
ards. In addition, sociological research shows that 
a mere 7% of land owners will be willing to sell 
their property.9 The act envisages the preparation 
of a plan to provide financial support to natural 
persons and farms intending to buy land, howev-
er, it is uncertain whether the programme could 
enable a large-scale lending activity.10 Although 
in theory giant agricultural holdings have more 
opportunities to take out a loan, a major portion 
of them are in debt and are unlikely to be able 
to find funds to buy vast areas of land in a short 
time. Therefore, it should be expected that the 
process of land ownership change will be spread 
over many years.
The final wording of the act has failed to impose 
a restriction on the concentration of land in one 
territorial entity to 33%. With the 10,000 hectare 
limit already in place, imposing such a restriction 
at the regional level would be pointless. However, 
this change means that in the case of smaller ter-
ritorial entities (hromadas, or communes), a single 
buyer will be able to buy all the agricultural land 
located in this area.
Finally, there are serious doubts regarding the 
provision granting the pre-emption right to the 
leaseholder of a specific plot of land. This is lim-
ited to lease agreements signed in 2010 or earlier. 
Private owners will be required to sell land to the 
leaseholder only when no other potential buyer 
offers a higher price. The issue of buying state-
owned land, which would otherwise be banned, 
remains unclear. In line with the current regula-
tions, the leaseholder will have the right to buy 
it without a tender at a relatively low regulated 
price. There is no information concerning the area 
of state-owned land that would be available for 
this type of purchase, but it seems that this may 
be loophole enabling long-term leaseholders to 
9 ‘Лише 7% землевласників збираються продавати пай у 
разі відкриття ринку’, Українські Національні Новини, 
10 September 2019, www.unn.com.ua.
10 A bill was submitted to the Verkhovna Rada envisaging the 
creation of a special purpose fund which is to be co-funded 
by international donors.
The adoption of the act should be 
viewed as a breakthrough decision 
resolving a problem that should have 
been eliminated many years ago.
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obtain property rights at a relatively low price. 
While it is difficult to expect private owners to 
offer their land for sale below the market value, 
in the case of state-owned land there is a risk that 
this may occur. At present, it is difficult to predict 
how this type of transaction will be carried out in 
practice; detailed rules are expected to be defined 
in a separate act.
Outlook
The shifting of the deadline for lifting the mora-
torium from October 2020 (which was envisaged 
in the bill’s first reading) to July 2021 gives the 
Verkhovna Rada and the government more time to 
adopt additional laws, to amend the current laws 
and to prepare several necessary implementing 
acts, for example defining the rules of land auction 
and of keeping a land register.11 The transitional 
period will enable the biggest agricultural market 
players to adjust to the new reality. The decision 
to lift the moratorium entirely as late as 2024 is 
justified in the context of the looming economic 
crisis in Ukraine caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. 
A rapid opening of the land market would pose 
a significant risk that a major portion of the land 
bought on loans would be taken over by banks 
should the buyers prove unable to repay their 
loans.
It is currently difficult to assess how the 10,000 
hectare land ownership limit will affect the oper-
ation of the giant agricultural holdings in Ukraine. 
Nine of them currently lease areas in excess of 
100,000 hectares, and there are dozens of others 
whose areas exceed 10,000 hectares. While smaller 
companies will likely be able to bypass the ban by 
registering their land as belonging to the company 
owner’s family members, the remaining ones will 
be forced to continue to lease most of their land. 
It is unlikely that starting from 2024 a large-scale 
process of buying up land will happen. However, 
11 The Verkhovna Rada has by now adopted some of these 
legal acts – for example the act on the national infrastruc-
ture of geospatial data. A portion of them was adopted at 
the first reading. However, due to significant amendments 
to the act on the land market, they will also need to be 
amended.
this will depend on financial liquidity of the pur-
chasing entities and on the market price per one 
hectare, which at present is impossible to predict.
Regardless of these doubts, the adoption of the 
act should be viewed as a breakthrough deci-
sion resolving a problem that should have been 
eliminated many years ago (Ukraine continues to 
be Europe’s single remaining country to ban the 
trade in land). At present, it is difficult to assess 
how the agricultural land market will operate 
following the de facto lifting of the moratorium. 
The situation will depend on the quality of the 
new laws and the implementation of acts. It will 
also depend on the transparency of registers 
and on how the new legislation will be enforced 
in practice. However, it seems that in the long 
term the adopted model is likely to become an 
important source of economic growth.12 Increased 
access to loans will likely trigger a more dynamic 
development of small and medium-sized agricul-
tural companies. This means that the process of 
boosting the significance of agriculture (which 
has been evident in the Ukrainian economy in 
recent years) is likely to accelerate.
In addition, the introduction of land ownership is 
expected to give an impetus to the development 
of those sectors of the economy which require 
more intensive investments but nevertheless gen-
erate major profits. These include fruit farming 
and animal husbandry, in which land ownership 
rather than lease is of major importance. Due to 
the limited capital resources of Ukrainian compa-
nies, it should not be expected that this process 
12 Tymofiy Mylovanov, Minister of Economic Development, 
argued that the introduction of the land market in 2021 
will contribute to a 1% increase in Ukraine’s GDP. ‘Рынок 
земли: Милованов рассказал, какой прирост ВВП ожи-
дают в этом году’, Экономическая правда, 6 February 
2020, www.epravda.com.ua.
The introduction of land ownership 
is expected to provide an impetus 
to the development of those sectors 
of the economy which require more 
intensive investments, such as fruit 
farming and animal husbandry.
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will be quick. The development of agriculture is 
likely to trigger the development of other related 
sectors of the economy such as food processing 
and the production of fertilisers. However, in this 
case one factor curbing this development is the 
unfavourable mood for investment evident in 
Ukraine, mainly resulting from corruption and the 
lack of the reform of the judiciary. In the coming 
years, no significant improvement of this situation 
should be expected.
The economic growth impetus would be much 
greater if foreign entities were allowed to buy 
land. However, this would pose the risk that they 
would buy a major portion of Ukrainian land. 
Considering the public mood, it seems unlike-
ly that the Verkhovna Rada would support this 
solution. In the coming years, the adopted act 
will not trigger radical changes. Instead, it will 
provide a legal framework enabling breakthrough 
structural and ownership changes in Ukrainian 
agriculture. It should be expected that in the 
mid-term perspective, regardless of economic 
problems caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, the 
agricultural reform and the related investments 
enabling the development of agriculture will sig-
nificantly boost the importance of Ukraine as one 
of the world’s leading producers of foodstuffs .13
13 This mainly involves unprocessed and semi-processed 
products such as grain and cooking oil, rather than ready-
made foodstuffs.
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APPENDIX
Regulated price (in hryvnias) of one hectare of land depending on its agricultural 
purpose in Ukraine (as on 1 January 2020)1
Region arable land orchards meadows pastures
Kharkiv region 32,237.00 67,015.10 6,280.76 6,427.07
Kherson region 24,450.00 37,072.18 5,314.49 4,284.71
Khmelnytsky region 30,477.00 52,756.57 6,763.90 5,258.51
Cherkasy region 33,646.00 74,144.37 8,454.87 5,648.03
Chernihiv region 24,065.00 55,608.28 8,696.44 5,063.75
Chernivtsi region 33,264.00 62,737.54 5,556.06 5,063.75
Dnipropetrovsk region 30,251.00 55,608.28 7,971.74 6,232.31
Donetsk region 31,111.00 58,459.98 7,247.03 6,037.55
Ivano-Frankivsk region 26,087.00 37,072.18 4,831.36 4,479.47
Kyiv region 26,531.00 42,775.60 6,280.76 4,479.47
Kirovohrad region 31,888.00 67,015.10 8,696.44 6,037.55
Lviv region 21,492.00 27,091.21 5,797.63 4,089.95
Luhansk region 27,125.00 47,053.16 8,213.30 5,842.79
Mykolaiv region 27,038.00 47,053.16 8,213.30 5,842.79
Odessa region 31,017.00 62,737.54 8,938.01 7,011.35
Poltava region 30,390.00 64,163.40 5,556.06 4,284.71
Rivne region 21,938.00 37,072.18 5,072.92 3,700.43
Sumy region 26,793.00 49,904.86 6,522.33 4,674.23
Ternopil region 29,035.00 57,034.13 6,280.76 5,648.03
Vinnytsia region 27,184.00 47,053.16 3,140.38 1,558.08
Volyn region 21,806.00 41,349.74 6,039.19 4,479.47
Zakarpattia region 27,268.00 37,072.18 6,522.33 5,258.51
Zaporizhia region 24,984.00 41,349.74 6,039.19 4,868.99
Zhytomyr region 21,411.00 35,646.33 5,072.92 4,089.95
Autonomous Republic of Crimea 26,005.00 58,459.98 10,145.85 4,284.71
1 Quoted after: ‘Оприлюднена нормативна грошова оцінка сільськогосподарських земель станом на 01.01.2020’, Ліга 
Закон, 16 January 2020, buh.ligazakon.net/ua.
